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A recent paper [P. Martin-Dussaud, C. Rovelli, F. Zalamea, arXiv:1806.08150] has given a lucid
treatment of Bell’s notion of local causality within the framework of the relational interpretation
of quantum mechanics. However, the authors went on to conclude that the quantum violation of
Bell’s notion of local causality is no more surprising than a common cause. Here, I argue that this
conclusion is unwarranted by the authors’ own analysis. On the contrary, within the framework
outlined by the authors, I argue that the implications of the relational interpretation are much more
radical.
BACKGROUND
In [1], an analysis of Bell’s notion of local causality was
given from the standpoint of the relational interpretation
of quantum mechanics [2]. The authors made the follow-
ing points, which I take to be convincing. To paraphrase:
(1) Bell’s notion of local causality is a statement about
the beables of the theory (i.e. the candidate elements of
reality);
(2) The definition and properties of the beables, and
hence the applicability of local causality, depends on
one’s interpretation of quantum mechanics;
(3) According to the relational interpretation, all phys-
ically meaningful beables relative to an observer are
located within that observer’s past light-cone;
(4) In particular, Bell’s criterion of local causality can
only be meaningfully defined (and violated) relative
to an observer whose past light cone encompasses all
relevant beables.
An observer in this context refers to a physical system
that is localized to a time-like trajectory of finite or in-
finite extent in space-time (a world-line segment) [3]. It
will be useful to restrict our attention to finite observers,
whose world-lines stretch from an initial ‘starting event’
to a final ‘terminal event’. The ‘past light cone’ refer-
enced in point (3) above is then understood to mean the
past light-cone of the observer’s terminal event, which
encompasses the past light-cones of all other events on
the observer’s world-line (This elaboration was not made
in [1] but I take it to be consistent with their analysis).
We now review the last point (4), and its analysis in
[1]. A Bell measurement scenario is defined by a set of
beables {A,B,N,M,Λ}O. The beables A,B refer to the
outcomes of two measurements on different parts of a
quantum system. N is a set of beables that are in the
causal past of A (but not B), which includes the mea-
surement setting relevant to A. Similarly M is a set
of beables that are in the causal past of B (but not A),
which includes the measurement setting relevant to B. Λ
represents a set of beables in the common causal past of
A,B, including the preparation of the quantum system.
All of these beables are interpreted as being ‘physically
meaningful’ relative to the observer O and are therefore
all located in this observer’s past light-cone. It remains
to be specified exactly where in the past light-cone they
are situated, which will be the main point of contention
taken up later on; for the time being let us follow [1] by
locating the beables as shown in Fig. 1.
FIG. 1. A space-time diagram showing the approximate loca-
tion of the beables {A,B,N,M,Λ}O relative to an observer
O, according to [1]. The circles are the space-time regions
where local measurements take place, and the thin lines de-
lineate their past and future light-cones. Since O considers
{A,N}O to be space-like separated from {B,M}O, a viola-
tion of Bell’s inequalities for these beables implies a violation
of local causality relative to this observer.
The authors of [1] do not specify the entire world-
line of O because their analysis only depends on the
observer’s ‘past light cone’ and hence only on the ter-
minal event of the world-line, labelled OT in the dia-
gram. For any observer terminating at this event, the
beables A,B,N,M,Λ will be in their past light cone and
thus potentially physically meaningful. Any such ob-
server can potentially witness the experimental violation
of Bell’s inequalities and hence reject Bell’s condition of
local causality. The latter condition may be expressed
relative to the observer O as the following condition on
the observed probabilities:
P (a|λ, n, b)O = P (a|λ, n)O , (1)
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2where the lowercase letters represent the specific values
of the associated beables. It is important to notice that
the relativisation of the beables to the observer O has
apparently gotten us no further towards explaining or
avoiding this violation of local causality – it has only
made it a problem for a smaller class of observers than is
usually considered, namely those terminating at an event
in the future light-cones of both measurements. For these
observers, however, the problem seems just as strong as
it would be without the relational interpretation.
At this juncture, the authors of [1] choose to bite the
bullet and give up on local causality. The faulty assump-
tion, they argue, is the idea that the correlations among
the effects of a common cause should disappear when
the common cause is conditioned upon. This assumption,
also known variously as ‘Reichenbach’s quantitative prin-
ciple of common causes’ [4], ‘factorization’ and ‘decorre-
lating explanation’ [5], is often argued to be based upon
the assumption that the underlying physics is determin-
istic. Authors sympathetic to the idea that quantum
mechanics is a fundamentally non-deterministic theory
have therefore found good reason to reject this assump-
tion, and thus to reject Bell’s local causality as being a
meaningful notion of ‘locality’ for quantum mechanics.
This approach, while perfectly respectable, is quite in-
dependent of the relational interpretation. Indeed, if one
does not regard local causality as being the proper no-
tion of locality for indeterministic beables (as advocated
in [1]), then it hardly seems to matter whether these be-
ables are relational or not: all of the heavy lifting has
already been done by the appeal to ‘indeterminism’, and
there is nothing that conceptually requires relationalism.
I would like to suggest that the authors of [1] have given
up too easily. In the remainder of this comment, I show
that a more careful examination of beables in the rela-
tional interpretation allows us to avoid violations of Bell’s
notion of local causality altogether. There is no need to
reject the factorization principle of common causes – the
relational interpretation can dissolve the problem with-
out assistance. This solution comes at a price: one must
be willing to take the relational interpretation of beables
seriously and pursue it to its logical limit. As we will
see, this has some radical consequences that are likely to
make even the authors of [1] uncomfortable.
WHEN DOES A BEABLE BEGIN TO BE?
Imagine that you, a keen astronomer, are the observer
O. You are the witness to a shocking event, let us say
a murder, that occurs in front of your eyes as you are
watching events on the Mars base through your telescope.
The perpetrator and victim are both known to you: the
troubled relationship between Alice and Bob is no secret
among the close-knit quantum information community.
But now Alice has taken things past the point of no re-
turn, plunging a knife deep into Bob’s heart. Let us call
the violent act M , and let W be the event that light from
the murder lands upon your startled eyes. The terminal
event OT of your observer-world-line occurs shortly after
W (after which we may suppose you are a wholly dif-
ferent person). Thus M clearly satisfies the criterion of
being within your past light-cone. The question is, where
in your past light-cone did M actually happen?
Hurriedly, you tear a map of Minkowski space-time
from the wall, intending to mark with your pencil the
exact space-time event of the murder M . Logic compels
you to say that it happened on Mars, and so you trace
backwards the path of the photons from the event W –
whose co-ordinates are obviously known to you – all the
way back to their origin on Mars’ surface, to a location
just outside a popular Mars disco.
Then doubt sets in – on what grounds can you say that
M really happened? The only fact directly accessible
to you is the fact that photons carrying the image of a
murder impacted your retinas at event W . Surely you
are entitled to reason that this was caused by an actual
murder that took place elsewhere, but this only seems
to support the notion that M is not itself a beable, but
rather it is something more of an analytic fact deduced
from the actual beables. These latter would include W ,
plus any relevant memories from your life history, but not
anything resembling a direct experience of (i.e. physical
interaction with) the actual murder M . For you, there is
really no M in the sense of ‘beable’, but only W , which
occurs of necessity right where you were standing at the
telescope, and not 64 million kilometers away on Mars.
Well, what about Bob? M is surely a beable to him.
Moreover, on being murdered, Bob might reasonably ex-
pect light from this event to reach your eyes informing
you of the betrayal – he might even be certain that you
are in the habit of observing Mars at precisely the mo-
ment that light from the foul deed would reach Earth.
But to him, it is M that is the real beable and W that
is only an abstract rational deduction from it. We are
only taking seriously what the relational interpretation
says: beables arise in local interactions between systems.
W arises from the interaction between the light arriv-
ing at your telescope and you, and so it is physically
meaningful to you (but not to Bob). M arises from the
deadly interaction between Alice and Bob, and is physi-
cally meaningful to them, but not to you.
Let me pause to examine a possible objection to this
line of thought. Surely, there is an objective sense in
which M actually happened that goes beyond the matter
of whether light from M reached O. Suppose that at
the critical moment the International Space Station
happened to pass between you and Mars, obstructing
the view through your telescope, and preventing any
light rays from Mars from reaching you. Nevertheless,
Bob is dead, and will be dead when you next meet him
(in the morgue). Let us therefore suppose that there
3is nothing that happens within the past light-cone of
an observer that is not a beable for that observer, and
strengthen statement (3) to the following:
(3): Light-cone version: All physically meaningful
beables relative to an observer are located within that ob-
server’s past light-cone, and all beables in the observer’s
past light cone are physically meaningful to that observer.
This objection allows us to maintain some measure of
observer relativism but without going the whole hog. It
allows us to say that a beable comes into existence for
an observer merely when it is possible ‘in principle’ for
information about it to reach the observer.
To reply to this, it is enough to probe into the deeply
unsatisfactory concessions lurking within that phrase ‘in
principle’. The past light-cone refers to light travelling
in a vacuum, yet nowhere in the universe is a true vac-
uum to be found. Thus, the rule (3)’ would have us
admit that beables become physically meaningful to us a
moment before light actually reaches us in any realistic
circumstance, having been slowed down by an interven-
ing medium. They are said to be physically meaningful
only because the light would have reached us at the same
time if only the intervening matter hadn’t been there.
If the absurdity of that counterfactual isn’t troubling
enough, consider that this approach denies any possible
connection between beables and local physical interac-
tions. Suppose I were to seal up an observer in a tank
that maintained the quantum state of their body at the
highest possible purity, preventing nearly all their physi-
cal interactions with the external environment. Relative
to that observer, is it really sensible to insist on the phys-
ical meaningfulness of external events that cannot possi-
bly affect them in any way? Note that one cannot escape
from this bind by saying that these events would be rel-
evant to the observer’s experience in a possible future in
which they are released from the tank. To talk mean-
ingfully about an observer, we must designate a terminal
event OT after which the observer effectively ceases to
exist, for it is this event that defines the past light-cone
as a strict subset of space-time. If the observer is kept
in a tank until this point, the argument carries through
unchanged. One could try appealing to a counterfactual
– that the beables are physically meaningful by virtue of
the consequences they would have if the observer weren’t
in the tank – but this leads us astray from the original
relational interpretation, which assigns beables to physi-
cal interactions that actually occur, not to hypothesized
local interactions that might occur.
There seems, in short, no way to avoid the conclusion
that the space-time location of beables for an observer O
occur at the space-time location of the relevant physical
interaction with that observer, which means along the
observer’s world-line. Thus we should rather strengthen
(3) to the following:
(3): World-line version: All physically meaningful
beables relative to an observer are located along that
observer’s past world-line.
This rather simple manoeuvre completely transforms
the nature of quantum theory’s conflict with local causal-
ity. In effect, there is trivially no conflict, because for any
real observer O, the beables that correspond to that ob-
server’s experience of the two measurement events cannot
be space-like separated. Thus, in cases where correlations
do not admit factorization by a purported common cause,
the criterion of local causality can present no objection
to an explanation in terms of a causal effect from one to
the other. Let us spell this out in a little more detail.
FIG. 2. The space-time locations of the beables relative to
three different observers. For each observer, the physically
meaningful beables are located on that observer’s world line
(dashed lines). The relative beables are represented by solid
circles, colour-coded to match their corresponding observer.
The black labels A,B,N,M,Λ are not beables relative to
any individual observer, but represent abstract beables con-
structed from the combined information of all three observers.
In general, the observers for whom the key beables
A,B,N,M,Λ are physically meaningful can be classified
into three categories (see Fig. 2). In the first category are
those such as the observer O1 in the figure, for whom the
beables {A,B,N,M,Λ}O1 occur in a time-like sequence
in which {A,N}O1 come before {B,M}O1 . There may
yet be reasons to doubt that correlations between them
are due to an actual causal influence from the former to
the latter (more on this in a minute), but such a causal
explanation can no longer be excluded on the grounds
of violating Bell’s notion of local causality, since for the
observer in question the relevant beables are time-like
(rather than space-like) separated events. A symmetric
argument can be made for observers like O2 for whom
{B,M}O2 are in the time-like past of {A,N}O2 . The
third class of observers are those like O3, for whom the
4beables {N,M}O3 first become physically meaningful at
a single space-time event, and subsequently {A,B}O3 at
a later event along the world-line. Again, O3 is free
to suppose a causal explanation (in either direction) be-
tween {A,N}O3 and {B,M}O3 to help explain the ob-
served violations of Bell inequalities, since the beables in
question are only time-like separated.
Here a critic can raise a serious objection, for if, say,
O1 wishes to explain the violation of Bell inequalities
by appealing to a causal influence from NO1 to BO1 ,
then she is also obliged to explain why this supposed
influence does not permit her to transmit a signal to
BO1 by manipulating NO1 , as it is well-known that
quantum mechanics forbids such signalling. Fortunately,
it is precisely here that the relational interpretation
comes through with a beautiful explanation, which only
requires an expansion of the domain of the relativity
principle to the following:
Extended relativity principle: In cases where
different observers dispute the direction of causality, the
laws of physics do not permit any experiment that could
favour the view of one observer over another.
If it were possible for O1 to signal to BO1 by manipu-
lating NO1 , this fact would force O2 to agree that N is
in the time-like past of B, which agrees better with O1’s
placement of the beables than that of O2. This would
seem to favour {A,B,N,M,Λ}O1 as being the ‘true be-
ables’ instead of {A,B,N,M,Λ}O2 , which would violate
the extended relativity principle. Hence, if the latter is
to be respected, signalling cannot be possible.
The extended relativity principle admittedly stretches
the imagination, as we are not used to thinking of causal
relations as being observer-dependent in the same way
that simultaneity is, or the time-ordering of space-like
separated events. Yet some recent work has given us
reasons to think of causality as a relative concept [6–9].
The extended relativity principle would have us distin-
guish two types of causes in nature: those whose exis-
tence and direction is agreed upon by all observers (and
hence which can be used for signalling) and those whose
existence is agreed upon by all observers but whose di-
rection is observer-relative, and these kinds of causal in-
fluence cannot be used for signalling. Bell-inequality vi-
olation can therefore be interpreted as the discovery of
this second category of causal relations in nature.
RESCUING OBJECTIVITY
The world-line version of (3) seems to force on us a
picture of reality that is hopelessly fragmented: if each
observer has their own personal beables, then what is it
that unites their experiences and gives rise to the emer-
gence of an objective reality? True enough, ten people
looking at the same tree will all see something different,
but the ‘world-line version’ of (3) seems to commit us to
saying that the tree is an illusion, and there are in fact
ten trees, one for each observer. Something is clearly
missing from this account – we can’t seem to see the tree
for the forest.
The solution is to recognize that there are two aspects
to ‘reality’, namely a personal aspect and a collective as-
pect. The personal reality of an observer is just what
we have been describing, namely, the beables that are
strung out along that observer’s own world-line, which
represent the private experiences of the observer. How-
ever, our reality is constructed not only from our own
observations, but also those made by other people. In
the example of the Bell experiment, consider a meeting
between the observers O1 and O2. These observers may
find it compelling to make an identification between the
beable {A}O1 (seen by O1) and the beable {A}O2 (seen
by O2), by choosing to regard these as different points
of view of one and the same abstract beable A. This A
really is an abstraction, because it is derived from a pair
of beables that are not jointly ‘physically meaningful’ for
any single observer, at least not in the same strong sense
as each individual’s private beables. Yet it does have a
claim to being physically meaningful for the collective of
observers whose disparate beables it unites. This fusion
of several disparate ‘realities’ into a single ‘collective real-
ity’ is only possible if one makes an identification between
the beables of different observers, by imagining them to
represent different points of view of the same ‘thing’. The
‘thing’ in question (the abstract beable) is only as real as
much as the proposed identification of beables between
observers makes sense.
If we grant that such identifications can be made (on
whatever grounds), we can then imagine filling space-
time with observers and allowing them to communicate
with each other, pooling their separate experiences to
reconstruct their past light-cone using abstract beables
whose space-time location is the same for all members
of the community. Thus, despite initial appearances, the
world-line version of (3) does not commit us to a hope-
less subjectivity, but leaves enough room for observers to
reach agreement on the existence of ‘objective’, perhaps
better named abstract or ‘inter-subjective’ beables.
SOME HOLES IN THE PLOT
I have argued that the relational interpretation of be-
ables in [1] does not necessarily run into conflict with
Bell’s notion of local causality, because for any actual ob-
server in space-time, the relevant beables corresponding
to each measurement only become physically meaningful
after the observer interacts with some system carrying
information about them, such as a light beam, and thus
are always time-like (and not space-like) separated for
5that observer. However, the violation of Bell inequali-
ties between these time-like separated beables still con-
flicts with a common cause explanation, if we adhere to
principle of common-cause factorization. Each observer
is then forced to posit a direct causal relationship be-
tween the time-like separated beables, and as we have
seen, they may not agree on the direction of this cause.
But this also raises a new question: what is the physical
nature of this causal connection? Can we make it explicit
within a dynamical model? For instance, can we define
a state of the system relative to O1 such that manipulat-
ing {N}O1 can be seen to dynamically affect the relative
state of {B,M}O1? Such an account, if possible, would
lend more credibility to this idea.
It is also important to emphasize that the entire argu-
ment depends upon the assumption that Bell’s notion of
local causality applies only to beables as I have defined
them (as direct physical interactions with an observer)
and not to what I have been calling abstract beables. This
move can easily be attacked. Consider that, though they
may be abstract, the latter are no less beables insofar as
they are the very building blocks of what the observers
call ‘objective reality’ as explained in the preceding sec-
tion, and thus may well be the appropriate subject mat-
ter of local causality. As an analogy, consider the case of
the classical electromagnetic field. The beables are repre-
sented by the local measurements of this field performed
by various observers in various places, but what of the
values of the field in parts of space where it was not mea-
sured by any observer? We nevertheless infer that the
field has a value there and everywhere else in space, and
by this inference we introduce the electromagnetic field
as an abstract beable (or abstract-beable-valued function
if you prefer), which constitutes an element of our shared
reality. Now when we discuss local causality in the con-
text of electromagnetism, we can ask whether this con-
straint applies only to the isolated and patchy parts of
the field that were actually measured (the field beables),
or whether it applies to the electromagnetic field as a field
of abstract beables filling all of space. Surely, it is the
latter. If we continue to extend local causality to abstract
beables in a like manner when considering quantum sys-
tems, then our argument given above cannot save local
causality from Bell inequality violations. In this case, we
must admit that the relational interpretation has made
little headway in solving this problem, and a move such
as rejecting common-cause factorization as in Ref. [1]
may be warranted.
Finally, a gap remains regarding the precise way in
which observers are supposed to construct a coherent pic-
ture of reality. Since we have given up on any external
reality as the origin of our sense-experiences, then why
should we expect even the appearance of such a reality to
emerge between us? It may seem that we are assuming
an unexplained miracle by supposing that the phenomena
of our private experiences should admit identifications to
be made between us (why should the tree that I see look
anything similar to the one that you see?) Without mak-
ing this assumption, the notion of an objective world and
indeed science itself would be impossible. True enough,
but note that the realist faces a similar problem, since
he must take it on faith that an orderly external world
exists in the first place – after all, why should it? The
mystery was there all along, we have only relocated it by
emphasizing that it is not a question about how things
came to exist prior to, and independent of, observation,
but rather a question of how things come to exist through
the physical process of observation.
By thus refocusing the problem, we may have gotten
closer to resolving it. Recent related work by M. Mu¨ller
[10] has argued that the emergence of an apparent reality
for all observers can derived from the principle that
Solomonoff induction correctly predicts each observer’s
future observations. Thus, there may be an answer to
the question of why a single objective world seems to
exist, if we only let go of the idea that it must exist
a priori. Then objective reality is rather more like a
tapestry collectively woven by many observers; each of
us contributes one patch of it made of our own private
experiences, and these are stitched together by our
physical interactions with one another, as dictated by
the rules of quantum mechanics. Perhaps this is the
real lesson to be drawn from the relational interpretation.
I thank G. Barreto Lemos for helpful feedback on an
earlier draft.
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